In a blog entry written last week, Red Hat executive Mark Webbink drew an analogy between Microsoft and Novell's recent deal and the Munich Agreement of 1938, a frequently cited example of appeasement-gone-wrong. The Munich Agreement, which surrendered a portion of Czechoslovakia to Nazi Germany without the authorization of the Czech government, failed to bring about the era of peace promised by its architects. With his analogy, Webbink is implying that Novell sold out the open source community for the sake of a potentially empty promise for greater interoperability.
Webbink dissects Novell's letter to the open source community, challenging the company's commitment to fighting software patents. Webbink's criticisms of Novell's open letter primarily focus on semantic distinctions with varying levels of subtlety. For instance, he points out that the open letter fails to inform readers that Novell's intellectual property indemnification program for customers is limited exclusively to copyright and doesn't address patents.
Webbink also draws attention to a significant discrepancy between a statement in the open letter and the company's official patent policy. In the open letter, Novell affirms its commitment to using its "own software patents to protect open source technology." By comparison, the company's official patent policy states that the company "will use its patent portfolio to protect itself against claims made against the Linux kernel or open source programs included in Novell's offerings."
The Red Hat executive concludes his blog entry by saying, "Novell wants us to believe their position on open source and patents hasn't changed. I'm having a hard time buying that argument."
Although I think that Webbink has at least a few cogent criticisms, I'm not sure that his conclusion is sound. In fact, his analysis of the discrepancies between the open letter and the company's long-standing official patent policy seems to suggest that Novell's position on patents has changed very little. Novell's official policy states that the company will use its intellectual property to protect itself and its offerings, which is exactly what the company attempted to do by making an agreement with Microsoft. The real issue isn't whether or not Novell has changed, but whether or not the company's less-than-surprising policy of self-interest really constitutes irrational and dangerous appeasement in this instance. It's a debate that will only grow as the consequences of Novell's deal with Microsoft become more tangible.
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