Advanced

Using Linux Software in Defense Systems Violates Every Principle of Security Says Green Hills Software's CEO and Founder

Posted by dave on · 13 comments
Press release
Mail this story
Print this story

The proliferation of the Linux open source operating system through a growing number of U.S. defense systems poses a serious and urgent security threat, Dan O'Dowd, CEO of Green Hills Software Inc., said today in a speech to the Net-Centric Operations Industry Forum in McLean, Va.

MCLEAN, Va.--April 8, 2004--The proliferation of the Linux open source operating system through a growing number of U.S. defense systems poses a serious and urgent security threat, Dan O'Dowd, CEO of Green Hills Software Inc., said today in a speech to the Net-Centric Operations Industry Forum in McLean, Va.

The Linux operating system is being developed by an open source process -- a cooperative effort by a loose association of software developers from all over the world. "The very nature of the open source process should rule Linux out of defense applications," O'Dowd said. "The open source process violates every principle of security. It welcomes everyone to contribute to Linux. Now that foreign intelligence agencies and terrorists know that Linux is going to control our most advanced defense systems, they can use fake identities to contribute subversive software that will soon be incorporated into our most advanced defense systems."

In addition, developers in Russia and China are also contributing to Linux software. Recently, the CEO of MontaVista Software, the world's leading embedded Linux company, said that his company has "two and a half offshore development centers. A big one in Moscow and we just opened one in Beijing -- so much for the cold war." Also, the CEO of LynuxWorks, another embedded Linux supplier, acknowledged that his company has a development center in Moscow.

Linux software, including contributions from Russia and China, is spreading rapidly through the Defense Department because it can be freely downloaded from the Internet without a license agreement or up-front fees, bypassing legal, purchasing and security procedures. A recent survey conducted over a two-week period by the Mitre Group found 251 Department of Defense deployments of Linux and other open source software.

Linux has been selected to control the functionality, security and communications of critical defense systems including the Future Combat System, the Joint Tactical Radio System and the Global Information Grid. "If Linux is compromised, our defenses could be disabled, spied on or commandeered. Every day new code is added to Linux in Russia, China and elsewhere throughout the world. Every day that code is incorporated into our command, control, communications and weapons systems. This must stop," O'Dowd said.

"Linux in the defense environment is the classic Trojan horse scenario -- a gift of 'free' software is being brought inside our critical defenses. If we proceed with plans to allow Linux to run these defense systems without demanding proof that it contains no subversive or dangerous code waiting to emerge after we bring it inside, then we invite the fate of Troy," O'Dowd said.

Advocates of the Linux operating system claim that its security can be assured by the openness of its source code. They argue that the "many eyes" looking at the Linux source code will quickly find any subversions. Ken Thompson, the original developer of the Unix operating system -- which heavily influenced Linux -- proved otherwise. He installed a back door in the binary code of Unix that automatically added his user name and password to every Unix system. When he revealed the secret 14 years later, Thompson explained, "The moral is obvious. You can't trust code that you did not create yourself. No amount of source-level verification or scrutiny will protect you from using untrusted code."

"Before most Linux developers were born, Ken Thompson had already proven that 'many eyes' looking at the source code can't prevent subversion," O'Dowd noted.

"Linux is being used in defense applications even though there are operating systems available today that are designed to meet the most stringent level of security evaluation in use by the National Security Agency, Common Criteria Evaluation Assurance Level 7 (EAL 7)," O'Dowd said. "We don't need cheaper security. We need better security. One 'back door' in Linux, one infiltration, one virus, one worm, one Trojan horse and all of our most sophisticated network-centric defenses could crumble. We must not abandon provably secure solutions for the illusion that Linux will save money. We must not entrust national security to Linux," O'Dowd concluded.

About Green Hills Software

Founded in 1982, Green Hills Software Inc. is the technology leader for real-time operating systems and software development tools for 32- and 64-bit embedded systems. Our royalty-free velOSity microkernel, INTEGRITY RTOS, C/C++ compilers, MULTI and AdaMULTI Integrated Development Environments and TimeMachine debugger, offer a complete development solution that addresses both deeply embedded and high-reliability applications. Green Hills Software is headquartered in Santa Barbara, Calif., with European headquarters in the United Kingdom.

Green Hills Software, the Green Hills logo, MULTI, INTEGRITY, velOSity, AdaMULTI and TimeMachine are trademarks or registered trademarks of Green Hills Software Inc. in the United States and/or internationally. All other trademarks and products are the property of their respective owners.

North American Sales Contact: Green Hills Software Inc., 30 W. Sola St., Santa Barbara, CA 93101, Tel: 805-965-6044, Fax: 805-965- 6343, Web site: [HYPERLINK@www.ghs.com,] E-mail: [e-mail:sales@ghs.com].

International Sales Contact: Green Hills Software Ltd., Dolphin House, St. Peter Street, Winchester Hampshire SO23 8BW, United Kingdom, Tel: +44 (0)1962 829820, Fax: +44 (0)1962 890300, E-mail: [e-mail:mktg-europe@ghs.com].

  Nav
» Read more about: Story Type: LXer Press Releases; Groups: LynuxWorks, MontaVista

» Get new stories by e-mail: nightly or as they are published

« Return to the newswire homepage

  Related stories
» More like this

Comments (13)

I'm guessing...

dave Story submitter ·
I'm guessing that Dan is feeling a significant loss of business as a result of Linux being deployed. Every time Linux is installed in the US government, this guy loses yet another potential customer.

So, rather than compete on even terms, he is launching his own attack against Linux, using scare tactics and hysterical screeching. I doubt anyone will listen to him.

dave
Hi Dave I agree. I meant to vote Neg to the Article but if I managed to vote for your comment I apologize profusely Maybe someone should point this guy to the LinuxSE that is developed by the NSA or CIA can't remember which
if unix is closed source and no one was allowed to see it, how would anyone be able to see Ken thompson back door of password and username???? i just cant understand that logic.Is this american paranoia we are seeing??????
I know someone who's quite an expert in this area. His observation was that writing secure software was difficult, that the number of bugs per thousand lines of code was nearly constant, independent of operating system, the programming language used, and so forth. This was his view several years ago, and it hasn't changed since.

I also feel that writing secure software is indeed very difficult; this article suggests that generalizing about it is much easier.

He contracdicted himself

The Unix Trojan was in a closed source of the Unix compiler, it can be in a closed source OS any day and to make that type of Trojan, you have to start with a piece of software that you do not trust. If they want all the trust they need, start by asking the NSA to compile your compiler with there complier (I assume they trust the compiler they use. The source code for the backdoor used by Ken Thompson was not seen because it could not be seen.
The NSA compiler had to be compiled using something. The problem is not about trusting NSA's compiler but about trusting this previous compiler (let's call it CC).

If CC is Thompsonized (pardon the neologism), then the NSA compiler is.

You can only dodge this by reading the NSA compiler's ASM code, or some other labour-intensive solution.

Rules for Voting

Hi Anyone know the voting rules?

Am I voting for the story or if I think the story was worthy of being included in LXer.

Example This story in interesting although the author is clearly having an agenda and as such I would vote for it to be included. Other stories like the diatribe by Endele in eWeek are so predictable and silly that they no longer need to be included on LXer.
I had the same thought.. What if you think the article is complete B.S, but worthy of reading since it's something you think ppl should be aware of...
dave Story submitter ·
Whether you agree with points of the article or not:

If you think it's worth reading (as I did, when I posted it) then vote Yes.

If you think it was a waste of time, then vote No.

dave
one point to be aware of on enderle.he is being read on major news sites and we need to respond to the diatribes he posts to them.if you ignore him he gets his side told without an opposing viewpoint never being raised so he is then accepted as fact.some can be ignored but enderle is not one that i recommend being ignored.responding with rants to him does not help tho.enderle never supports his opinion with facts ,it is always as he believes or something similar.he can make you mad tho because of this so maintaining calm is very hard to do .sigh br3n

Xenophobic

The term xenophobe springs to mind reading this. I'm sure America's Enemies (aka the rest of the world) would love to see the American Military standardize on secure commercially supported American software from Microsoft.

If I were a military commander I would standardize on something like OpenBSD and require all software procured by the military run on that platform

so much for the Ken Thompson

Ken Thompson created a back-door in a Unix product that was used by nobody. Well, "nobody" if you compare it to the widespread usage and peer-review of the modern Linux. That argument is fallacious. Thompson's backdoor escaped scrutiny because very few people looked at that code, and that's because there was no motivation to do so. Nowadays, the Linux code is analysed by thousands of security specialists on a permanent basis. The "Ken Thompson backdoor" could never happen.
Ken Thompson didn't put a backdoor anywhere.

He did, however, explain how to create one in such a way that it can't bee seen unless you read the compiler-generated ASM. No amount of looking at source code can find that kind of backdoor. That's the whole point of his paper.

Come on, it's Ken Thompson. Do you think he did the obvious thing?

I suggest you read his paper before commenting on it.

Post a comment

A free account is needed to post. Write your comment here first: your text is kept in this browser while you sign up or log in, and is waiting for you when you come back.

Your message:
|||||
10
Markdown: **bold**, *italic*, [text](https://link), - lists, > quotes, $x^2$ for math. Formatting help

Sign up and post (it is free)  or  Log in and post