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Green Hills Software Issues White Paper: ``Linux Security: Unfit for Retrofit''

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Third in Series of White Papers on Security Risks Posed by the Use of Linux in U.S. Defense Systems

Dan O'Dowd, Green Hills Software founder and CEO, today issued his third white paper in a series focused on the urgent security threat posed by the use of the Linux operating system in U.S. defense systems, including the Future Combat System and Global Information Grid. Available at [HYPERLINK@www.ghs.com] the white paper "Linux Security: Unfit for Retrofit" explains why the security limitations of Linux are innate and cannot be practically remedied. "There is no way to fix Linux to bring it up to the level of security that is required for national defense systems, a level that is already available in proprietary operating systems," O'Dowd said.

"There is a widespread misconception that open source software inherently provides better security than proprietary software. But, according to the U.S. Government's database of computer security vulnerabilities maintained by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), there have been more vulnerabilities of the highest severity in the Linux operating system than in Microsoft Windows in every one of the last ten years!

"Many people believe that the U.S. National Security Agency's (NSA) Security Enhanced Linux (SELinux) is going to solve Linux's security problems, but according to the frequently asked questions page on the NSA website, SELinux 'is very unlikely to meet any interesting definition of secure system.'

"The license that governs Linux requires defense contractors to publish the source code of the operating system for any critical defense system that uses Linux. There is a widespread misconception that this disclosure improves security by allowing anyone to review the source code for potential vulnerabilities. However, the source code of a defense system's operating system provides a blueprint for its security. Disclosure of the source code makes it possible for our enemies to ascertain the performance, timing, capabilities, and vulnerabilities of the system, including the existence and design of secret devices and encryption chips. This is analogous to publishing the wiring diagrams of our military bases. Our enemies will be able to study our vulnerabilities at their leisure. When it comes to defense systems, secrecy is a critical component of security. Open source code is sure to reduce security for defense systems.

"Some people argue that defense contractors could avoid the largest security perils of Linux (i.e. that much of Linux has been developed offshore by unknown personnel and that the source code must be made public exposing its capabilities and vulnerabilities to attackers) by making a copy of Linux, thoroughly evaluating it for subversions, securing its source code, and then proceeding with development using security checked personnel. Green Hills Software's extensive experience with safety certification by the Federal Aviation Administration, which is just a subset of a full security evaluation, shows that a thorough security evaluation will cost over $1,000 per source code line. A thorough evaluation of Linux for subversions would cost billions of dollars.

"Many people assume that all code incorporated into major military systems undergoes extensive analysis, review, and vulnerability assessment, but Linux has been selected for use in defense systems with insufficient analysis, review, or vulnerability assessment, because the cost of this analysis would be prohibitive. If a defense program requires a certain level of product requirements specification or documentation or a certain process for development, testing, code review, analysis, or vulnerability assessment, then all of the operating system code must meet the same or higher standards. If it doesn't, all of the efforts to meet the security and reliability requirements for the rest of the software are meaningless.

"Every principle of security is being violated to enable Linux to spread through our defense systems. This must not be allowed to continue."

The next Linux Security white paper in the series, "Linux in Defense: Free Software is Just Too Expensive," will be published on May 10. It shows that Linux is not the lowest cost operating system for defense systems and that Linux does not offer the long-term support model that defense systems need. Prior white papers and articles are archived at [HYPERLINK@www.ghs.com]

About Green Hills Software

Founded in 1982, Green Hills Software Inc. is the technology leader for real-time operating systems and software development tools for 32- and 64-bit embedded systems. Our royalty-free velOSity microkernel, INTEGRITY RTOS, C/C++ compilers, MULTI and AdaMULTI Integrated Development Environments and TimeMachine debugger, offer a complete development solution that addresses both deeply embedded and high-reliability applications. Green Hills Software is headquartered in Santa Barbara, CA, with European headquarters in the United Kingdom.

Green Hills Software, the Green Hills logo, MULTI, INTEGRITY, velOSity, AdaMULTI and TimeMachine are trademarks or registered trademarks of Green Hills Software, Inc. in the U.S. and/or internationally. All other trademarks and products are the property of their respective owners.

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Comments (4)

He simply doesn't understand.

He simply doesn't understand

Linux has more distrobutions with thousands of software titles. Each of these have to be checked, just like propertiry software. He is adding pu the number of probelms in all distros, and all software packages and comparing it to a much smaller number based off one or two vendors who don't provide everything.

His articles are just simply propaganda, he makes software for planes, and other high end systems, yet compares his speciality software to Linux which is a general use OS.

His last article said he would discuss NSA's SE Linux yet all he does is quote a small line and use that as all the proof.

He is sounding more like an anti-linux zealot with each article. Providing less facts and more bogus BS with each statement.
IMHO, thus far, O'Dowd is only ranting on what 'might' or what 'could' happen. O'Dowd doesn't seem to provide any concrete examples of HOW would, WHEN would or WHO could exploit a FLOSS 'lack of security' issue in a real way. It would be different if he (or his company) had actually attempted or executed an exploit on his/their own, and then been able to provide hard facts and evidence to support his claims. The community(ies) could then take his evidence, formulate their own tests, trials etc. and independently 'prove' his claims in a reasonable manner. Until he offers some proof, his claims are all hot air. Still, not to dismiss him entirely, I'd welcome a 'panel' of top security folks (not CEOs of private companies with high-margin Gov't contracts like O'Dowd) to give an update on this issue, at least providing some recent hard facts and perspectives (i.e. Windows and GNU/Linux 'exploits' are not 'on par' with each other, as the tech press make them out to be - an exploit is not 'just an exploit', not all exploits can be compared equally).

Anyone know if Bruce Schneier has publicly weighed in on any of O'Dowd's comments ? I think he'd have some interesting points about some of the claims. For example, there's a great quote of his from this link just last week: http://www.technewsworld.com/perl/story/33504.html

... Consider, on this, what Bruce Schneier says in the introduction to the second edition of his book Applied Cryptography about the difference between security and obscurity:

"If I take a letter, lock it in a safe, hide the safe somewhere in New York, then tell you to read the letter, that's not security. That's obscurity. On the other hand, if I take a letter and lock it in a safe, and then give you the safe along with the design specifications of the safe and a hundred identical safes with their combinations so that you and the world's best safecrackers can study the locking mechanism -- and you still can't open the safe and read the letter -- that's security." ...

Kind of sums it all all up very succinctly (why I like Schneier, he's not only a top-notch 'security guy', he writes well to boot !). Schneier ,IMO, actually uses his brain when discussing security issues.

Sounds like the same argument

I didn't read the second paper (or indeed much of this one) but it seems it's still the same argument. 3 papers for one argument? Bottom line is: If your system relies on secrecy then it's not as secure as as system that does not need secrecy.

Nothing to see here move along.

Don't even bother RTFA for this one as it just more ranting and FUD spreading by this fool. Its obvious as pointed out before that:

1. O'Dowd fears Linux 2. O'Dowd is trying to push(sell$$$$) Green Hills Software's RTOS as an alternative or the right tool for the job 3. O'Dowd has not discussed if the same security issues & flaws that he is accusing Linux and FOSS of having affect his products. 4. O'Dowd belives heavily in security through obscurity 5. O'Dowd is a FUD troll

He is either very ignorant of how Linux works or is just trying to stifle the competition.

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