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RSA president slams crypto backdoors as useful only against petty criminals
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Comments (40)
20 earlier comments in the full thread.
>That the All Writs Act was passed by some of the same men who framed the Bill of Rights, means nothing about its Constitutionality.
True... However, SCOTUS has already included All Writs in an opinion:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/All_Writs_Act
Therefore, as I've written in prior threads... in order for Apple to have a favorable SCOTUS opinion, the above case must also be reviewed and the prior ruling found incorrect. Or... find that All Writs does not apply for some reason.
Apple's legal argument, as far as I can tell, is that All Writs does not apply -- and not that All Writs is unconstitutional.
In any case... I repeat in big bold letters:
True... However, SCOTUS has already included All Writs in an opinion:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/All_Writs_Act
wikipedia wrote:The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in United States v. New York Telephone Co. 434 U.S. 159 (1977) that the act provided authority for a U.S. District Court to order a telephone company to assist law enforcement officials in installing a device on a rotary phone in order to track the phone numbers dialed on that phone, which was reasonably believed to be used in furtherance of criminal activity.
Therefore, as I've written in prior threads... in order for Apple to have a favorable SCOTUS opinion, the above case must also be reviewed and the prior ruling found incorrect. Or... find that All Writs does not apply for some reason.
Apple's legal argument, as far as I can tell, is that All Writs does not apply -- and not that All Writs is unconstitutional.
In any case... I repeat in big bold letters:
dotmatrix wrote:There is no FBI request for a 'master key' to decrypt everyone's iPhone. In fact, this is not mathematical possible.
Just because one request made under the All Writs Act was found to be Constitutional, doesn't mean that all requests under the All Writs Act are Constitutional...
And requiring a company to write software and cryptographically sign it is not the same as providing assistance in installing a wiretap on a single (mostly mechanical) device... It's an order of magnitude, if not several, more ominous.
And requiring a company to write software and cryptographically sign it is not the same as providing assistance in installing a wiretap on a single (mostly mechanical) device... It's an order of magnitude, if not several, more ominous.
>Just because one request made under the All Writs Act was found to be Constitutional, doesn't mean that all requests under the All Writs Act are Constitutional...
Wrong wording. The All Writs Act is either Constitutional or not, the appropriateness of its application is not governed by its Constitutionality.
>And requiring a company to write software and cryptographically sign it is not the same as providing assistance in installing a wiretap on a single (mostly mechanical) device... It's an order of magnitude, if not several, more ominous.
I disagree and so does the government. The 'assistance' has nothing whatsoever to do with the product in question. All Writs could apply to any sort of evidence gathering warrant.
Apple's argument does not address All Writs as an inappropriate legal tool for assistance in writing software... instead they have argued that CALEA applies rather than All Writs. This is not because All Writs is 'wrong' or not applicable -- it's because Congress may have written a statute governing this type of assistance. The argument here is much more subtle than it seems...
Apple is making a lot of public noise as a distraction -- but the legal argument, when looked at dispassionately, is quite sound for the government's case.
Wrong wording. The All Writs Act is either Constitutional or not, the appropriateness of its application is not governed by its Constitutionality.
>And requiring a company to write software and cryptographically sign it is not the same as providing assistance in installing a wiretap on a single (mostly mechanical) device... It's an order of magnitude, if not several, more ominous.
I disagree and so does the government. The 'assistance' has nothing whatsoever to do with the product in question. All Writs could apply to any sort of evidence gathering warrant.
Apple's argument does not address All Writs as an inappropriate legal tool for assistance in writing software... instead they have argued that CALEA applies rather than All Writs. This is not because All Writs is 'wrong' or not applicable -- it's because Congress may have written a statute governing this type of assistance. The argument here is much more subtle than it seems...
Apple is making a lot of public noise as a distraction -- but the legal argument, when looked at dispassionately, is quite sound for the government's case.
@penguinsit
>> 3. In the case of Apple vs. US government, we have a demand to facilitate access to someone's private data. I understand the value of court issued "search warrants" to collect evidence to prosecute criminals, and it might be that the US government is being totally open with us on this and that there is no hidden agenda here. But, are we totally certain that the demand on Apple is not a red herring or a way to set a precedent. I don't know one way or the other, but that leads me to point 4: 4. With all due respect, a healthy amount of critical skepticism is quite appropriate.<<
Right on! Iwouldn't so easily accomodate the US government to automatically volunteer-over to them private citizen information. Besides once you go along with so-called "temporary expediencies" to hand over the Keys to the Kingdom, you ain't NEVER getting 'em back!
@jdixon
jd: >Like I said, when you're ready to argue in good fatih...
dm: >> And the legal answer is clearly, Yes.
jd: > Again, your opinion. Apple disagrees.
While naturally dm will DENY this, it seems to me that dm is LESS DISINTERSTED in the outcome of Apple's compliance with the goverment's demands then he/she will care to admit. In other words, you're likely to hit a wall from all of your anti-government technical code arguments with whatever ulterior motives dm has in continuing this thread (no question UNsympathetic to Apple Inc!)
2 more c's
waiting for dm's insistent and FUD-laden denials any second now......
>> 3. In the case of Apple vs. US government, we have a demand to facilitate access to someone's private data. I understand the value of court issued "search warrants" to collect evidence to prosecute criminals, and it might be that the US government is being totally open with us on this and that there is no hidden agenda here. But, are we totally certain that the demand on Apple is not a red herring or a way to set a precedent. I don't know one way or the other, but that leads me to point 4: 4. With all due respect, a healthy amount of critical skepticism is quite appropriate.<<
Right on! Iwouldn't so easily accomodate the US government to automatically volunteer-over to them private citizen information. Besides once you go along with so-called "temporary expediencies" to hand over the Keys to the Kingdom, you ain't NEVER getting 'em back!
@jdixon
jd: >Like I said, when you're ready to argue in good fatih...
dm: >> And the legal answer is clearly, Yes.
jd: > Again, your opinion. Apple disagrees.
While naturally dm will DENY this, it seems to me that dm is LESS DISINTERSTED in the outcome of Apple's compliance with the goverment's demands then he/she will care to admit. In other words, you're likely to hit a wall from all of your anti-government technical code arguments with whatever ulterior motives dm has in continuing this thread (no question UNsympathetic to Apple Inc!)
2 more c's
waiting for dm's insistent and FUD-laden denials any second now......
>to hand over the Keys to the Kingdom, you ain't NEVER getting 'em back!
There are no keys to the kingdom.
Means...
There is no master key to access user data. And there is no possible master key to access user data.
In fact the only way to access user data is to guess the correct passcode. This is true even with Apple's help...
And...
Apple can guess... The 'backdoor' is already there... and Apple owns it and can open it at its own pleasure for passcode guessing fun for its own purposes... all without your knowledge.
Apple will never close this already existing 'backdoor', because this already existing 'backdoor' is necessary in order to update iOS.
So, if the government wanted to hide what it was doing... it would have served Apple with a secret warrant from the secret court and issued a gag order with stiff fines... and we wouldn't be having this discussion because no one would know.
There are no keys to the kingdom.
Apple iOS security guide wrote:The device’s unique ID (UID) and a device group ID (GID) are AES 256-bit keys fused (UID) or compiled (GID) into the application processor and Secure Enclave during manufacturing. No software or firmware can read them directly; they can see only the results of encryption or decryption operations performed by dedicated AES engines implemented in silicon using the UID or GID as a key. Additionally, the Secure Enclave’s UID and GID can only be used by the AES engine dedicated to the Secure Enclave. The UIDs are unique to each device and are not recorded by Apple or any of its suppliers. The GIDs are common to all processors in a class of devices (for example, all devices using the Apple A8 processor), and are used for non security-critical tasks such as when delivering system software during installation and restore. Integrating these keys into the silicon helps prevent them from being tampered with or bypassed, or accessed outside the AES engine. The UIDs and GIDs are also not available via JTAG or other debugging interfaces.
The UID allows data to be cryptographically tied to a particular device. For example, the key hierarchy protecting the file system includes the UID, so if the memory chips are physically moved from one device to another, the files are inaccessible. The UID is not related to any other identifier on the device.
Apart from the UID and GID, all other cryptographic keys are created by the system’s random number generator (RNG) using an algorithm based on CTR_DRBG. System entropy is generated from timing variations during boot, and additionally from interrupt timing once the device has booted. Keys generated inside the Secure Enclave use its true hardware random number generator based on multiple ring oscillators post processed with CTR_DRBG.
Means...
There is no master key to access user data. And there is no possible master key to access user data.
In fact the only way to access user data is to guess the correct passcode. This is true even with Apple's help...
And...
Apple can guess... The 'backdoor' is already there... and Apple owns it and can open it at its own pleasure for passcode guessing fun for its own purposes... all without your knowledge.
Apple will never close this already existing 'backdoor', because this already existing 'backdoor' is necessary in order to update iOS.
So, if the government wanted to hide what it was doing... it would have served Apple with a secret warrant from the secret court and issued a gag order with stiff fines... and we wouldn't be having this discussion because no one would know.
My understanding is that the requested change is a new firmware, that disables certain protective measures (escalating time delay, and "self-destruct after 10 wrong attempts" option) so that the FBI can brute-force the PIN.
I'd call that a "back-door" (if you don't like that terminology, call it a "back-gate" that allows the breaker access and opportunity to brute-force the back door).
At this point, arguing about the rest of it is sophistic quibbling. that simply sweeps the remaining considerations under the carpet and declares them to be non-existent.
I'd call that a "back-door" (if you don't like that terminology, call it a "back-gate" that allows the breaker access and opportunity to brute-force the back door).
At this point, arguing about the rest of it is sophistic quibbling. that simply sweeps the remaining considerations under the carpet and declares them to be non-existent.
>> Just because one request made under the All Writs Act was found to be Constitutional, doesn't mean that all requests under the All Writs Act are Constitutional...
> Wrong wording. The All Writs Act is either Constitutional or not, the appropriateness of its application is not governed by its Constitutionality.
See what I mean about good faith? Dotmatrix is simply restating JaseP's objection in different words and then claiming the original statement is invalid.
> The 'backdoor' is already there... and Apple owns it and can open it at its own pleasure for passcode guessing fun for its own purposes... all without your knowledge.
OK. For the benefit of others reading, yes Apple can sign updates to your OS. And that's what the government is requesting. That Apple create a special update to the OS that will allow as many guesses as necessary to get the password for this device. They have taken the extra step of requesting that it only be signed to be valid on this deivice. They want Apple to sign that software so that it will run on this device, install, and run it.
Simple enough, right? But... the special update Apple is being asked to create will be also usable on any device running the same OS, once it's signed appropriately for the device. Anyone who claims this won't open the floodgates for further such requests is delusional or has an ulterior motive.
Dotmatrix is (deliberately as far as I can tell) using the word key for both the software patch and the encryption signature used for signing of that patch, and then arguing the key already exists. The encryption signing signature (key) does, but the software patch does not. Both are necessary to unlock the device.
> Wrong wording. The All Writs Act is either Constitutional or not, the appropriateness of its application is not governed by its Constitutionality.
See what I mean about good faith? Dotmatrix is simply restating JaseP's objection in different words and then claiming the original statement is invalid.
> The 'backdoor' is already there... and Apple owns it and can open it at its own pleasure for passcode guessing fun for its own purposes... all without your knowledge.
OK. For the benefit of others reading, yes Apple can sign updates to your OS. And that's what the government is requesting. That Apple create a special update to the OS that will allow as many guesses as necessary to get the password for this device. They have taken the extra step of requesting that it only be signed to be valid on this deivice. They want Apple to sign that software so that it will run on this device, install, and run it.
Simple enough, right? But... the special update Apple is being asked to create will be also usable on any device running the same OS, once it's signed appropriately for the device. Anyone who claims this won't open the floodgates for further such requests is delusional or has an ulterior motive.
Dotmatrix is (deliberately as far as I can tell) using the word key for both the software patch and the encryption signature used for signing of that patch, and then arguing the key already exists. The encryption signing signature (key) does, but the software patch does not. Both are necessary to unlock the device.
>They have taken the extra step of requesting that it only be signed to be valid on this deivice.
This is wrong. Apple can only sign per device. Each update for each device needs to be signed individually. And Apple has the key and the only key which makes this possible. So it's not per government request -- it's per Apple's architectural design that one and only one device is being loaded with modified firmware. In order to gain passcode guessing access to other phones, the government would need a warrant for each phone.
>the special update Apple is being asked to create will be also usable on any device running the same OS, once it's signed appropriately for the device.
Correct. But Apple holds the key. And in order for the government to force Apple to individually sign the 'new' firmware, the government would need a new warrant -- for that device and only for that device.
>Dotmatrix is (deliberately as far as I can tell) using the word key for both the software patch and the encryption signature used for signing of that patch, and then arguing the key already exists. The encryption signing signature (key) does, but the software patch does not. Both are necessary to unlock the device.
No.
There are multiple keys.
There is the Apple CA root public key being used as the trust root. This key enables Apple to update its phones and ensure app signing is correct.
There is another key which is generated on the phone. This second key is used to encrypt user data. When you enter the passcode, this second key is used to decrypt the user data. Apple does not have this second key -- it never leaves the phone and is mathematically tied to the specific device via the UID... see prior post.
There are other keys too... but those keys are not necessary for the current discussion.
So, neither the government nor Apple has or will have or can have direct immediate access to any particular iPhone's user data.
The only key that the Government is asking Apple to use is its private key associated with the public key which has been inserted by Apple at manufacture time as a trust root for iOS system file [not user data] access.
This is wrong. Apple can only sign per device. Each update for each device needs to be signed individually. And Apple has the key and the only key which makes this possible. So it's not per government request -- it's per Apple's architectural design that one and only one device is being loaded with modified firmware. In order to gain passcode guessing access to other phones, the government would need a warrant for each phone.
>the special update Apple is being asked to create will be also usable on any device running the same OS, once it's signed appropriately for the device.
Correct. But Apple holds the key. And in order for the government to force Apple to individually sign the 'new' firmware, the government would need a new warrant -- for that device and only for that device.
>Dotmatrix is (deliberately as far as I can tell) using the word key for both the software patch and the encryption signature used for signing of that patch, and then arguing the key already exists. The encryption signing signature (key) does, but the software patch does not. Both are necessary to unlock the device.
No.
There are multiple keys.
There is the Apple CA root public key being used as the trust root. This key enables Apple to update its phones and ensure app signing is correct.
There is another key which is generated on the phone. This second key is used to encrypt user data. When you enter the passcode, this second key is used to decrypt the user data. Apple does not have this second key -- it never leaves the phone and is mathematically tied to the specific device via the UID... see prior post.
There are other keys too... but those keys are not necessary for the current discussion.
So, neither the government nor Apple has or will have or can have direct immediate access to any particular iPhone's user data.
The only key that the Government is asking Apple to use is its private key associated with the public key which has been inserted by Apple at manufacture time as a trust root for iOS system file [not user data] access.
Ok so it is clarified that the signed software runs on a phone that identifies itself with a particular ID. I wonder how these device IDs are programmed. I don't know, maybe someone here does. Perhaps an ID code is placed in a flash memory location or in an fpga at the time of manufacturing.
Now imagine what you could do with a little equipment. Nothing exotic, just a soldering station, a flash or fpga programmer. Things that I actually have myself over there in the hardware corner. Maybe I could get some consulting work here. Does anyone need an iDevice ID changed? I would imagine that our government labs are orders of magnitude more sophisticated than my basic hardware corner.
Leading me back to these points:
2. We (at least I) lost trust in our US government since the Snowden revelations.
4. With all due respect, a healthy amount of critical skepticism is quite appropriate.
Now imagine what you could do with a little equipment. Nothing exotic, just a soldering station, a flash or fpga programmer. Things that I actually have myself over there in the hardware corner. Maybe I could get some consulting work here. Does anyone need an iDevice ID changed? I would imagine that our government labs are orders of magnitude more sophisticated than my basic hardware corner.
Leading me back to these points:
2. We (at least I) lost trust in our US government since the Snowden revelations.
4. With all due respect, a healthy amount of critical skepticism is quite appropriate.
> I wonder how these device IDs are programmed. I don't know, maybe someone here does. Perhaps an ID code is placed in a flash memory location or in an fpga at the time of manufacturing.
I already posted this:
The portion of the circuitry where the UID and GID are stored is one time writable. Once the key is 'burned' into the chip, it's unchangeable. The electronic circuit element is referred to a fuse... thus the language 'fused' in the Apple security document.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Programmable_read-only_memory
ADD:
>Now imagine what you could do with a little equipment. Nothing exotic, just a soldering station, a flash or fpga programmer. Things that I actually have myself over there in the hardware corner. Maybe I could get some consulting work here. Does anyone need an iDevice ID changed? I would imagine that our government labs are orders of magnitude more sophisticated than my basic hardware corner.
You can't change the UID or the GID. You can swap the chip set, but if you do a swap, you will have thrown away the user data encryption trust root and thus the user data will remain forever encrypted.
I already posted this:
Quoting:The device’s unique ID (UID) and a device group ID (GID) are AES 256-bit keys fused (UID) or compiled (GID) into the application processor and Secure Enclave during manufacturing.
The portion of the circuitry where the UID and GID are stored is one time writable. Once the key is 'burned' into the chip, it's unchangeable. The electronic circuit element is referred to a fuse... thus the language 'fused' in the Apple security document.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Programmable_read-only_memory
ADD:
>Now imagine what you could do with a little equipment. Nothing exotic, just a soldering station, a flash or fpga programmer. Things that I actually have myself over there in the hardware corner. Maybe I could get some consulting work here. Does anyone need an iDevice ID changed? I would imagine that our government labs are orders of magnitude more sophisticated than my basic hardware corner.
You can't change the UID or the GID. You can swap the chip set, but if you do a swap, you will have thrown away the user data encryption trust root and thus the user data will remain forever encrypted.
Quoting: >Just because one request made under the All Writs Act was found to be Constitutional, doesn't mean that all requests under the All Writs Act are Constitutional...
Wrong wording. The All Writs Act is either Constitutional or not, the appropriateness of its application is not governed by its Constitutionality.
Where did you get your law degree?!?! A law can very much be unconstitutional as applied. This is especially so of an act like the All Writs, which cuts a path pretty wide in the potential actions that the gov't can request. Look back at the Wiki that you cited... It produces a four prong test with regards to All Writs. Check out the fourth one... That very heavily will depend on what the gov't is asking someone to do. That is; one request may be wholly Constitutional, another not...
As for the gov't agreeing with you,... Well the gov't thinks that is doesn't need a warrant in a whole lot of instances either. So what the gov't thinks doesn't mean diddly.
>A law can very much be unconstitutional as applied.
Give an example... or it didn't happen.
Give an example... or it didn't happen.
> Give an example... or it didn't happen.
Does the law say police have a right to question a suspect? Google Miranda ruling.
Does the law say police have a right to question a suspect? Google Miranda ruling.
Quoting:>A law can very much be unconstitutional as applied.
Give an example... or it didn't happen.
I love it when non-lawyers, particular computer people (who typically see things as binary), try to argue law...
Here's an article that might enlighten you a little bit... http://elsterlaw.com/facially-unconstitutional-unconstitutio...
>>> Give an example... or it didn't happen.
>Does the law say police have a right to question a suspect? Google Miranda ruling.
If you have a law degree yourself, please teach me...
I'm fully capable of reading, and would gladly appreciate a link to some case law regarding Constitutional laws which are labeled Unconstitutional when applied in a particular scenario.
In the Miranda ruling the questioning a suspect was not found to be Unconstitutional rather Miranda is a balancing of two separate Constitutional rights which are seemingly at odds with one another.
However... IANAL... and am using the language in the best way I know how and understand. The logical argument for the government's case in the Apple controversy makes sense. The logical argument for Apple's refusal does not seem to make sense.
However, I am an engineer, and am trained in both electronics and cryptography. And many of the basic claims made by many of the 'woe is us' crowd are just plain wrong, and show little to no understanding of the either the technical issues nor of the legal framework.
>Does the law say police have a right to question a suspect? Google Miranda ruling.
If you have a law degree yourself, please teach me...
I'm fully capable of reading, and would gladly appreciate a link to some case law regarding Constitutional laws which are labeled Unconstitutional when applied in a particular scenario.
In the Miranda ruling the questioning a suspect was not found to be Unconstitutional rather Miranda is a balancing of two separate Constitutional rights which are seemingly at odds with one another.
However... IANAL... and am using the language in the best way I know how and understand. The logical argument for the government's case in the Apple controversy makes sense. The logical argument for Apple's refusal does not seem to make sense.
However, I am an engineer, and am trained in both electronics and cryptography. And many of the basic claims made by many of the 'woe is us' crowd are just plain wrong, and show little to no understanding of the either the technical issues nor of the legal framework.
@JaseP:
Thank you!
It would help to post things like that upfront. Now I have some reading and learning to do... However, I don't believe the basic argument has changed.
Thank you!
It would help to post things like that upfront. Now I have some reading and learning to do... However, I don't believe the basic argument has changed.
After reading the facial / as applied link...
It would seem to me that since the All Writs Act already makes the distinction between existent and non-existent statutes, that it would be impossible to find it Unconstitutional as applied. If a statute exists, then the existent statute means the application of All Writs is incorrect -- but does that mean the same as "Unconstitutional as applied" ... I don't know.
And it really doesn't matter for the argument. The courts will decide whether CALEA applies, and if it doesn't then certainly All Writs does apply because that's its role -- to apply where there is no statute. If CALEA applies then the courts will indicate that the government's application of All Writs has no merit... but again is that the same as "Unconstitutional as applied" ... and does it matter... since precedent will be formed anyway regardless of language.
It would seem to me that since the All Writs Act already makes the distinction between existent and non-existent statutes, that it would be impossible to find it Unconstitutional as applied. If a statute exists, then the existent statute means the application of All Writs is incorrect -- but does that mean the same as "Unconstitutional as applied" ... I don't know.
And it really doesn't matter for the argument. The courts will decide whether CALEA applies, and if it doesn't then certainly All Writs does apply because that's its role -- to apply where there is no statute. If CALEA applies then the courts will indicate that the government's application of All Writs has no merit... but again is that the same as "Unconstitutional as applied" ... and does it matter... since precedent will be formed anyway regardless of language.
> ...and would gladly appreciate a link to some case law regarding Constitutional laws which are labeled Unconstitutional when applied in a particular scenario.
No one has said the law is unconstitutional. Only that the application of the law could be. Exactly as JaseP said above.
> In the Miranda ruling the questioning a suspect was not found to be Unconstitutional rather Miranda is a balancing of two separate Constitutional rights which are seemingly at odds with one another.
That's sort of like saying a circle is not an ellipse because it only has one focus. The application of the questioning was found to violate the suspect's Constitutional right to not incriminate himself.
> And it really doesn't matter for the argument. The courts will decide...
Which is what I've been saying. Now, that doesn't mean I'll agree with their decision, but what I think and $5 will get a cup of coffee at Starbucks.
No one has said the law is unconstitutional. Only that the application of the law could be. Exactly as JaseP said above.
> In the Miranda ruling the questioning a suspect was not found to be Unconstitutional rather Miranda is a balancing of two separate Constitutional rights which are seemingly at odds with one another.
That's sort of like saying a circle is not an ellipse because it only has one focus. The application of the questioning was found to violate the suspect's Constitutional right to not incriminate himself.
> And it really doesn't matter for the argument. The courts will decide...
Which is what I've been saying. Now, that doesn't mean I'll agree with their decision, but what I think and $5 will get a cup of coffee at Starbucks.
>Which is what I've been saying. Now, that doesn't mean I'll agree with their decision, but what I think and $5 will get a cup of coffee at Starbucks.
Agree with that too...
However...
So... while an individual can try to arm chair the CALEA v. All Writs decision point... the rest of the argument is utter nonsense.
Also -- if you have an iPhone and are interested in keeping the user data secure, simply set a long alpha-numeric passcode and do not sync to the cloud... and your user data will remain protected regardless of the outcome of this case because no legal argument is going to magically change your current hardware and architecture.
Agree with that too...
However...
dotmatrix wrote:There is no master key. And the FBI request is necessarily restricted to a singular phone on a singular warrant. And there is no such thing as a 'backdoor' which opens every iPhone's user data for LE inspection. The only possibility is a passcode guessing game. And this is necessarily limited to 80ms per guess. And the FBI has not requested any changes to this architecture, design, or policy. Any changes that would allow anything other than a pure brute force attack every 80ms would require new hardware on a new phone.
So... while an individual can try to arm chair the CALEA v. All Writs decision point... the rest of the argument is utter nonsense.
Also -- if you have an iPhone and are interested in keeping the user data secure, simply set a long alpha-numeric passcode and do not sync to the cloud... and your user data will remain protected regardless of the outcome of this case because no legal argument is going to magically change your current hardware and architecture.
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Doesn't mean that in the slightest. A person (even a founding father) is perfectly capable of acting in the most noble cause in one moment and then betraying that cause in the next. And Washington, despite being a generally (excuse the pun) very honorable man, was a man nonetheless and on occasion acted dishonorably (the Whiskey Rebellion comes to mind). That the All Writs Act was passed by some of the same men who framed the Bill of Rights, means nothing about its Constitutionality.